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AN UNJUST BARGAIN: PLEA BARGAINS AND 
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court estimates that at least ninety percent 
of criminal convictions are based on guilty pleas. Frequently, criminal de-
fendants are required to waive their appellate rights as a condition of the 
plea bargain. The Supreme Court has not addressed the validity of these 
waivers, but most federal and state courts to address the issue hold them 
enforceable when they are made knowingly and voluntarily. A minority of 
states grant defendants the statutory right to appeal adverse determina-
tions on motions to suppress evidence following the entry of a guilty plea. 
California and New York hold that this additional appellate right may be 
waived in a plea agreement. This Note asserts that waivers of this specific 
right should not be enforceable because such waivers are often extracted 
under coercive circumstances that violate due process and contract law 
principles. Furthermore, waivers of this right contravene legislatures’ in-
terest in efficiency by encouraging defendants to proceed to trial solely to 
preserve their claims of error for appeal. 
Introduction 
 On December 17, 1986, Police Officers Diaz and Atkins observed 
Alfredo Ventura walking down the street while patrolling a “drug prone” 
area of Manhattan.1 Diaz became suspicious when he saw Ventura ad-
justing his jacket pocket.2 Based on this observation, the officers parked 
their car and followed Ventura, who had entered a locked building and 
was in the vestibule area.3 Diaz and Atkins entered with their hands on 
their guns and approached Ventura as he attempted to open the door to 
the building’s interior.4 When Ventura turned and responded to Diaz’s 
questions, Diaz noticed a bulge on the left side of Ventura’s jacket.5 
Without making any inquiry, Diaz immediately put his hand on the 
bulge, felt that it was hard, and ordered Ventura to unzip his jacket.6 
                                                                                                                      
1 People v. Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (App. Div. 1988). 
2 Id. 
3 See id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 529. 
6 Id. 
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Ventura complied, and Diaz reached inside the jacket and retrieved a 
brown paper bag containing nine ounces of cocaine.7 
 The government brought charges against Ventura for criminal 
possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees.8 The 
trial court denied Ventura’s pretrial motion to suppress the cocaine 
evidence.9 The officers stated at the motion hearing that they believed 
Ventura may have had a gun in his jacket.10 The court concluded that 
Diaz’s conduct in touching the visible bulge and ordering Ventura to 
open his jacket was reasonable under the circumstances.11 
 Prior to the hearing, the government offered Ventura a plea to 
second-degree possession with a minimum sentence of three years if he 
withdrew his motion to suppress.12 Because the government’s entire 
case rested on the evidence of the cocaine, it would have been required 
to drop all charges if the judge granted the motion and excluded this 
evidence.13 The government, however, warned Ventura that if he pro-
ceeded with the motion and lost, the plea offer’s sentence would be 
doubled to a minimum of six years.14 Furthermore, the government 
would require that Ventura waive his right to appellate review of the 
suppression motion in the subsequent plea.15 
 Nevertheless, Ventura proceeded with his suppression motion.16 
After losing, he accepted the less-favorable plea bargain and came be-
fore the appeals court seeking a reversal of the suppression ruling.17 
The government contended that the issue was not properly before the 
appellate court because Ventura had waived his right to appeal the 
suppression motion in his plea.18 The appeals court reached the issue, 
                                                                                                                      
7 Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 529. 
8 Id. at 529 n.2. 
9 Id. at 529. The Fourth Amendment grants individuals the right “to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. To justify a frisk or pat down of an individual during a street encounter, 
the U.S. Supreme Court requires that police have a reasonable belief that the suspect is 
armed and dangerous based on specific facts and the inferences drawn from those facts. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The scope of this protective search is restricted to that 
which is necessary to discover weapons. Id. at 29. 
10 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 528–29. 
11 See id. at 529. 
12 Id. 
13 See id. at 531, 535. 
14 See id. at 529. 
15 Id. 
16 Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 529. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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“in the interest of justice,” and held the appellate waiver invalid.19 The 
court reviewed the merits of the suppression motion, granted suppres-
sion, reversed the guilty plea conviction, and dismissed the indict-
ment.20 These facts, excerpted from the New York Appellate Division’s 
1988 decision in People v. Ventura, underscore the coercive role that ap-
pellate waivers can play in criminal plea bargains.21 
 Plea bargains are the predominant means of resolving criminal 
cases, and their prevalence leads commentators to conclude that this 
process “is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the 
criminal justice system.”22 The U.S. Supreme Court has estimated that 
at least ninety percent of criminal convictions are based on guilty 
pleas.23 Increasingly, many criminal defendants are required to waive 
their right to appeal as a condition of the plea bargain.24 Appeal waivers 
of pretrial motions to suppress evidence, like the one in Ventura, are 
especially significant because decisions on these motions determine 
whether certain evidence, often essential to the government’s case, is 
admissible or must be excluded from trial.25 Because of the important 
role suppression motions play in final case outcomes, and the coercive 
manner in which suppression motion appeal waivers are often ex-
tracted, these waivers should be unenforceable.26 
 This Note evaluates the legal arguments in federal and state courts 
for and against the waiver of appellate rights in plea bargains, specifi-
cally the waiver of the right to appeal suppression motion determina-
tions.27 Part I explains the significance of plea bargains in the criminal 
system.28 It also identifies the appellate rights that remain following a 
guilty plea that may be subject to waiver.29 Part II evaluates the argu-
ments adopted by the majority of courts for enforcing appellate waiv-
                                                                                                                      
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 535. 
21 See id. at 528–29; Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 127, 129 (1995) (explaining that requiring a defendant to waive appellate 
rights is an increasingly common condition of plea agreements). 
22 Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 
1912 (1992). 
23 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970). 
24 See, e.g., People v. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819 (Ct. App. 1989) (noting that appel-
late waivers in plea bargains are a “powerful tool” in limiting undeserving appeals); People 
v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (App. Div. 1992) (stating that the court normally insists on 
such waivers in plea bargains); Calhoun, supra note 21, at 128. 
25 See 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531. 
26 See id. at 531–33; infra notes 211–292 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 116–210 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 36–76 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 36–76 and accompanying text. 
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ers.30 These courts conclude that such waivers comport with due proc-
ess, are supported by contract law, and advance public policy.31 Part III 
discusses the determinations made by the minority of courts, which 
hold these waivers per se invalid.32 These courts explain that the waivers 
contravene due process and contract law, and undermine public poli-
cies served by appellate review.33 Part IV examines the courts’ decisions 
on the specific waiver of the statutory right to appeal adverse suppres-
sion motion determinations following a guilty plea.34 Finally, Part V ar-
gues that where states have granted the statutory right to appeal ad-
verse suppression motions following a plea, the waiver of this right must 
never be valid.35 
I. Plea Bargains and the Waiver of the Right to Appeal 
 This Part outlines the importance of plea bargains in the criminal 
system.36 It begins by explaining the U.S. Supreme Court’s endorsement 
of this process as an efficient and equitable means of adjudicating 
criminal cases.37 It then details the waiver of constitutional rights in plea 
bargains.38 Lastly, it introduces the rights that a defendant retains, fol-
lowing a guilty plea, that he may waive in an express appellate waiver.39 
A. Policy Arguments for Plea Bargains 
 In 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Brady v. United States 
that guilty pleas serve a number of public policies and that the State may 
justifiably extend a benefit to a defendant who has extended a benefit to 
the State.40 By pleading guilty, a defendant who sees a small chance for 
acquittal can obtain concessions in his probable penalty, begin the cor-
rectional process promptly, and free himself from the burdens of a 
trial.41 For the State, avoiding a trial preserves scarce prosecutorial and 
judicial resources for those cases in which there is a substantial question 
                                                                                                                      
30 See infra notes 77–115 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 77–115 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 116–161 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 116–161 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 162–210 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 211–292 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 36–76 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 45–58 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 59–76 and accompanying text. 
40 See 397 U.S. 742, 752–53 (1970). 
41 Id. at 752. 
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about the defendant’s guilt or the State’s capacity to meet its burden of 
proof.42 Additionally, the defendant’s agreement to plead guilty satisfies 
the public’s interest in prosecution of crime and increases the chance 
for successful rehabilitation through prompt punishment.43 For these 
reasons, the Supreme Court has encouraged fair plea bargaining.44 
B. The Valid Waiver of Constitutional Rights in Plea Bargains 
 The Supreme Court addressed the waiver of constitutional rights 
in plea bargains in Brady when it held that defendants may waive these 
rights as a valid condition of a plea bargain.45 To comport with due 
process, the Court required that waivers of constitutional rights in 
guilty pleas be “voluntary[,] . . . knowing, intelligent acts done with suf-
ficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely conse-
quences.”46 
 The Supreme Court has instructed lower courts accepting guilty 
pleas to apply the knowing and voluntary test with great care.47 Courts 
must satisfy themselves that defendants’ admissions of guilt are accurate 
and reliable.48 The Court has explained that factors such as a defen-
dant’s representation by competent counsel and awareness of the na-
ture of the charges against him support the conclusion that a plea is 
constitutional.49 The Court noted, however, that an otherwise valid plea 
is not rendered invalid because the defendant overestimated the 
                                                                                                                      
42 Id. 
43 See id. at 752–53. 
44 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“If every criminal charge were 
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multi-
ply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”); Brady, 397 U.S. at 752–53. 
45 See 397 U.S. at 752–53. The Court explained that by admitting guilt, a defendant 
waives his Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination and his Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial. See id. at 748–49. The Court held that the fear of being 
sentenced to death following a jury trial did not render a guilty plea involuntary. See id. at 
749–50. The Court explained that it does not violate Fifth Amendment due process rights 
to encourage a guilty plea in exchange for leniency in the sentence recommendation. See 
id. One commentator has suggested that “[i]t is waiver of rights that permits the system of 
criminal justice to work at all.” Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal 
Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2011, 2011 
(2000). See generally Carl Takei, Note, Terrorizing Justice: An Argument That Plea Bargains 
Struck Under the Threat of “Enemy Combatant” Detention Violate the Right to Due Process, 47 B.C. 
L. Rev. 581 (2006). 
46 Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. 
47 See id. (characterizing the admission of guilt and relinquishment of constitutional 
rights as a “grave and solemn” act). 
48 Id. at 758. 
49 Id. at 756. 
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strength of the State’s case or the likely penalties stemming from a 
trial.50 Furthermore, although guilty pleas may dissuade a defendant 
from exercising constitutional rights, the Constitution does not bar 
criminal defendants from making those difficult decisions.51 
 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”) pro-
vides additional guidelines for district courts accepting guilty pleas.52 
The courts must address defendants directly and determine that they 
understand that their guilty pleas waive, amongst other things, their 
right to a jury trial, right to confront witnesses, and right to be free 
from self-incrimination.53 The court must also determine that the plea 
is voluntary and did not result from force or threats.54 
 States tend to follow the Brady guidelines and the FRCP when ac-
cepting guilty pleas.55 For example, Michigan courts require that no 
guilty plea shall be accepted by a trial judge until facts “sufficient to es-
tablish the defendant’s guilt have been set out in the record.”56 The 
court must make an inquiry “to ascertain that the plea was freely, un-
derstandably, and voluntarily made . . . .”57 Rule 17 of the Arizona Rules 
of Criminal Procedure states that a guilty plea must be accepted only 
when knowingly and voluntarily made by the defendant personally in 
open court.58 
C. Rights That Survive Guilty Pleas and Are Subject to Waiver 
 Increasingly, plea agreements in federal and state courts are condi-
tioned on the defendant’s express waiver of the right to appeal.59 For 
example, the guilty plea at issue in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
                                                                                                                      
50 Id. at 757. 
51 See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30–31 (1973) (noting that although the 
fear of the death penalty following a jury trial may have dissuaded the defendant from 
exercising his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, this discouragement did not render 
the plea involuntary). 
52 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. 
53 See id. 11(b)(1)(A)–(F). 
54 See id. 11(b)(2). 
55 See, e.g., Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.3 (requiring courts to address defendants in open court 
and determine that they voluntarily wish to forgo certain constitutional rights); People v. 
Carlisle, 195 N.W.2d 851, 852–53 (Mich. 1972) (requiring that a trial judge establish a 
factual basis for the plea and determine that it is knowingly and voluntarily made). 
56 Carlisle, 195 N.W.2d at 852. 
57 Id. at 853. 
58 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.3. 
59 See, e.g., People v. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819 (Ct. App. 1989) (encouraging waiv-
ers as a way to avoid frivolous appeals); People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (App. Div. 
1992) (observing that appellate waivers are generally required in pleas); Calhoun, supra 
note 21, at 129. 
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Fourth Circuit’s 1990 decision in United States v. Wiggins contained a 
provision stating that the defendant “expressly waives the right to appeal 
his sentence on any ground” in exchange for the concessions made by 
the government in this agreement.60 Explained one New York judge, “I 
normally insist on that on [sic] the price of my plea agreement.”61 
 Even in the absence of these express waivers, a guilty plea consti-
tutes a knowing and voluntary admission of factual guilt that forfeits a 
defendant’s ability to raise many, though not all, claims on appeal.62 In 
1973, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Tollett v. Henderson that a defen-
dant’s open-court admission to the charged offenses represents a break 
in the series of events that preceded it in the criminal process.63 Conse-
quently, a guilty plea sacrifices the defendant’s right to appeal inde-
pendent constitutional violations that occurred prior to the entry of 
the guilty plea.64 
 The Court clarified this rule when it stated that a guilty plea does 
not inevitably “waive” all prior constitutional violations.65 It explained 
that several violations do survive a guilty plea and can be appealed after 
the taking of the plea.66 A guilty plea merely renders irrelevant the con-
stitutional violations logically consistent with the establishment of the 
defendant’s guilt.67 For example, the constitutional claim of double 
jeopardy survives a guilty plea.68 Additionally, violations that occur dur-
ing the taking of the plea, such as claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, survive a guilty plea.69 Sentencing issues that arise after the 
court accepts a guilty plea can also be appealed.70 Lastly, certain states 
                                                                                                                      
60 905 F.2d 51, 52 (4th Cir. 1990). 
61 Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 141 (responding to a prosecutor’s statement during the Rule 
11 colloquy that the defendant had agreed to a “waiver of any rights he may have to appeal 
the plea or the hearing in this matter”). 
62 See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266–67 (1973) (concluding that defendant’s 
guilty plea foreclosed independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in grand jury 
selection). 
63 Id. at 267. 
64 See id. at 266–67. 
65 See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 & n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (holding that the 
defendant did not waive his double jeopardy claim when he entered the plea because the 
defendant’s claim was that the State could not convict him regardless of whether his fac-
tual guilt was established). 
66 See id. at 63 n.2. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267 (permitting a defendant to challenge the proceedings of 
the plea but not an antecedent constitutional violation). 
70 Cf. United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the 
statutory right to appeal a sentence can be waived); United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 
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have carved out statutory exceptions to the general rule stated in Tollett 
and permit defendants to appeal suppression motions despite the fact 
that their convictions were based on a guilty plea.71 All of these claims 
survive a guilty plea and can be subject to express appellate waivers.72 
 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the validity of 
appellate waivers in plea agreements, most U.S. courts of appeals and 
state courts to address the issue hold that a defendant may waive his 
right to appeal in a knowing and voluntary plea agreement.73 One fed-
eral district court and a minority of state courts, however, hold appel-
late waivers invalid because they find them per se violations of due 
process that contravene the public interest in appellate review and fair 
negotiations.74 California courts hold the specific waiver of the addi-
tional statutory right to appeal suppression motions valid so long as the 
waiver is knowing and voluntary.75 New York appellate courts, in con-
                                                                                                                      
F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to hear defendant’s appeal because he had validly 
waived his right to appeal his sentence as part of his plea agreement). 
71 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(m) (West 2007) (permitting the defendant to 
appeal the suppression motion following the plea provided that the defendant moved for 
suppression before the plea was entered); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70(2) (McKinney 
1970) (permitting an appeal of a suppression motion following a plea-based conviction); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-979(b) (West 1979) (permitting an appeal of a suppression 
motion following a plea-based conviction); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.31(10) (West 2009) (al-
lowing a defendant to challenge the denial of a motion to suppress evidence following a 
guilty plea). 
72 See, e.g., Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 53 (holding that the defendant could not appeal his 
sentence after he knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights as a condition of 
his plea bargain); People v. Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. 402, 406 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that 
a defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal the denial of a sup-
pression motion); People v. Williams, 331 N.E.2d 684, 684 (N.Y. 1975) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that the right to appeal suppression motions following a plea may be waived in certain 
circumstances). 
73 See, e.g., Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 54 (dismissing defendant’s appeal because his waiver 
was a knowing and voluntary act); Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (encouraging waiver of the 
right to appeal). Commentators suggest that although the Supreme Court has not ruled 
on the issue specifically, its approval of prosecutorial solicitation of waivers of the protec-
tions of Rule 11(e)(6) of the FRCP and Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence suggest 
that the Court would approve the practice of conditioning pleas on appellate waivers if the 
issue came before it. Calhoun, supra note 21, at 139 & n.63 (citing United States v. Mez-
zanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 214–16 (1995)). 
74 See, e.g., United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 49 (D.D.C. 1997) (classifying these 
waivers as unfair contracts of adhesion); People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1972) (invalidating a waiver because of the impermissible burden it placed on the 
right to appeal). 
75 See People v. Berkowitz, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 152 (Ct. App. 1995); Charles, 217 Cal. 
Rptr. at 406. 
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trast, are split over whether a knowing and voluntary waiver of the addi-
tional right must also be justified by a legitimate State interest.76 
II. The Majority of Courts’ Reasoning for Enforcing  
Appellate Waivers 
 Courts upholding appellate waivers utilize contract law, and due 
process and public policy considerations to justify their decisions.77 The 
majority of federal and state courts addressing the constitutionality of 
plea bargains conditioned on the express waiver of appellate rights 
hold these agreements valid so long as they are knowing and volun-
tary.78 Courts that hold these waivers enforceable under a due process 
analysis also explain that these waivers serve the public interest in final-
ity, efficiency, and the preservation of resources in the criminal justice 
system.79 Furthermore, certain courts upholding these waivers reason 
that contract law principles require enforcement because the parties to 
these agreements must be held to their promises.80 
A. Due Process Justifications and a Knowing and Voluntary Relinquishment 
 Courts enforcing appellate waivers conclude that because defen-
dants may waive constitutional rights in plea agreements, it follows that 
rights not protected by the Constitution, such as the statutory right to 
appeal, must also be waivable.81 Most U.S. courts of appeals and state 
                                                                                                                      
76 Compare People v. Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d 526, 531–32 (App. Div. 1988) (requiring 
implicitly that the waiver further a legitimate State interest in addition to being knowing 
and voluntary), with People v. Gray, 432 N.Y.S.2d 153, 153 (App. Div. 1980) (dismissing a 
defendant’s appeal because his waiver was knowing and voluntary). 
77 See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that a defendant could not appeal following his plea because his knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to appeal as part of his negotiated plea agreement did not 
violate due process or public policy); State v. Hinners, 471 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Iowa 1991) 
(holding that a defendant may expressly waive the right to appeal in a plea bargain when 
the waiver is knowing and voluntary). 
78 See, e.g., Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 319, 321; Hinners, 471 N.W.2d at 845; see also infra 
notes 81–93 and accompanying text. 
79 See Hinners, 471 N.W.2d at 845; infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
80 See United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that 
under contract law principles, appellate rights may freely be traded for something more 
highly valued); infra notes 103–115 and accompanying text. 
81 See, e.g., United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that if 
a defendant can waive constitutional rights in a plea, it follows that a defendant should 
also be able to waive statutory rights in a plea); Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321 (explaining 
that if due process permits the waiver of a constitutional right, then a defendant’s waiver of 
a statutory right must also be enforceable). 
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courts that have reviewed appellate waivers enforce them under the 
knowing and voluntary test.82 
 The U.S. Supreme Court holds that defendants may knowingly 
and voluntarily waive even uncertain rights.83 For this reason, circuit 
courts conclude that defendants may validly waive the right to appeal 
future sentencing errors.84 In 1990, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Navarro-Botello rejected the defendant’s 
argument that his plea was involuntary because he could not know 
what sentencing issue might arise until after sentencing.85 The court 
reasoned that the defendant knew he was giving up possible appeals, 
and even though he did not know exactly what the nature of those ap-
peals might be, this knowledge sufficiently rendered his plea volun-
tary.86 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has 
explained that because plea bargains are upheld when the defendant 
waives his right to a jury trial without knowing how well the State will 
make its case, they must be upheld when a defendant waives his right to 
appeal without knowing all the potential issues on appeal.87 
 Furthermore, in 1992, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. De-
Santiago-Martinez that an appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary 
even when the Rule 11 colloquy did not specifically mention its inclu-
sion in the plea.88 The court explained that the text of the waiver in the 
plea bargain was simple and clear.89 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit, in contrast, held in 1993 in United States v. Bushert that 
                                                                                                                      
82 See, e.g., United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that 
the court’s review was limited to whether the defendant’s decision to bind himself to the 
provisions of the agreement was knowing and voluntary); Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 319; 
People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (N.Y. 1989). Commentators advocating for such 
waivers note that trial judges are permitted not to honor a plea or to vacate a plea already 
taken if they find it does not satisfy the knowing and voluntary test. See Derek Teeter, 
Comment, A Contracts Analysis of Waivers of the Right to Appeal in Criminal Plea Bargains, 53 U. 
Kan. L. Rev. 727, 741 (2005). Furthermore, the fact that a “price” is placed upon the right 
to appeal by prosecutors does not contravene due process because prosecutors and defen-
dants place value upon all the “goods” they trade during the plea bargaining process to 
establish the plea’s conditions. See id. at 740. This limitation on the right to appeal, impor-
tantly, is not one imposed by the State to dissuade others from exercising that same right, 
but rather one accepted by the defendant during the exchange. Id. 
83 See Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (permitting an individual to give up 
a somewhat unknown right in agreeing not to file a § 1983 claim in exchange for the pros-
ecutor’s dismissal of pending criminal charges). 
84 Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 320 (discussing Newton, 480 U.S. 386). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 830 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1992). 
88 See 38 F.3d 394, 395 (9th Cir. 1992). 
89 See id. 
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most circumstances require an explicit Rule 11 discussion of the waiver 
for it to be valid.90 This discussion assures the judge that the defendant 
made a voluntary decision with an understanding of both the charges 
against him and the rights he was sacrificing.91 The government must 
show that the district court specifically questioned the defendant about 
the appeal waiver during the Rule 11 colloquy, or that there is a 
“[m]anifestly clear indication in the record that the defendant other-
wise understood the full significance of the sentence appeal waiver 
. . . .”92 Although there are variations in the knowing and voluntary test, 
the majority of U.S. courts of appeals that have evaluated appeal waivers 
permit them because they satisfy a due process analysis.93 
B. Public Policy Justifications 
 The judicial support for appellate waivers rests on public policies 
favoring finality, efficiency, and the preservation of judicial resources.94 
U.S. courts of appeals have explained that public policy supports these 
waivers because they save the time and money spent on appellate re-
view.95 For example, the Eighth Circuit has reasoned that the govern-
ment grants the defendant sentencing concessions in exchange for the 
knowledge that it will not need to expend resources preserving the 
judgment on appeal.96 The court has explained that a chief virtue of 
plea bargains is finality, and that appeal waivers serve this interest by 
preserving the finality of convictions reached through guilty pleas.97 
 In 1989, the New York Court of Appeals announced in People v. 
Seaberg that there was no affirmative public policy served by encourag-
ing appeals or prohibiting their waiver.98 Rather, the court identified 
final and expedient settlement of litigation that is free from coercion as 
a critical policy goal.99 The court concluded that the negotiation proc-
                                                                                                                      
90 997 F.2d 1343, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that a defendant’s knowing and vo-
luntary waiver of the right to appeal is generally enforceable, but holding that the appeal 
waiver in question was unenforceable because it was not specifically discussed during the 
Rule 11 colloquy). 
91 See id. at 1352. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. at 1351–52; DeSantiago-Martinez, 38 F.3d at 395. 
94 See Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1024–25. 
95 See Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 873; Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321–22. 
96 See Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 873 (dismissing appeal to preserve “bargained-for” finality). 
97 Rutan, 956 F.2d at 829. 
98 541 N.E.2d at 1025. 
99 Id. 
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ess serves little purpose if parties are not bound to their agreements.100 
That same year, the California Court of Appeal suggested in People v. 
Olson that trial judges and prosecutors obtain a defendant’s waiver of 
appellate rights in guilty pleas.101 The court explained that the public 
interest in an efficient and economical criminal justice system encour-
aged the inclusion of such waivers in pleas to free taxpayers and over-
whelmed appellate courts from frivolous appeals.102 
C. Contract Law Justifications 
 Some federal and state courts examine plea bargains under a con-
tract law analysis and conclude that appeal waivers constitute a mutually 
beneficial agreement.103 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit has characterized plea agreements as contracts between the de-
fendant and the government; a defendant waives his appeal rights in 
consideration for something more highly valued—a lesser sentence.104 
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that although it may appear unjust 
to allow criminal defendants to bargain away meritorious appeals, con-
                                                                                                                      
100 Id. at 1026. 
101 See 264 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819 (Ct. App. 1989) (noting that although little can be done to 
affect criminal appeals in cases that have gone to trial, appellate waivers in plea bargains are a 
“powerful tool” in limiting undeserving appeals). Commentators explain that many courts 
support waivers based on the idea that because there is a right to a free appeal, there is little 
incentive for defendants not to appeal, and thus the system is overwhelmed by meritless ap-
peals. See Calhoun, supra note 21, at 180. Courts frequently view such appeals as “endless 
quest[s] for technical errors unrelated to guilt or innocence” that make a mockery of the 
criminal justice system. See id. (quoting Warren E. Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar 
Association by the Chief Justice of the United States, 67 A.B.A. J. 290, 292 (1981)). This explanation, 
however, is critiqued by scholars who note that an increase in criminal appeals may be the 
result of factors outside of the control of the individual criminal defendants. Id. at 183. For 
example, complex federal sentencing statutes provide ample room for judicial error and 
create an appellate right where none previously existed. Id. 
102 See Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819. 
103 See, e.g., Howle, 166 F.3d at 1169 (explaining that plea agreements are bargains); Sea-
berg, 541 N.E.2d at 1025 (explaining that defendants have the choice of whether or not to 
accept the plea bargain). Scholars advocating a contract law approach to plea bargains state 
that because plea bargaining is driven by the interests of the parties to a case, the law should 
allow the parties broad discretion to maximize their interests by mutual agreement. Teeter, 
supra note 82, at 731. These commentators assert that contract law, rather than due process 
jurisprudence, should be used to analyze appeal waivers because contract law can most ade-
quately assure a free, fair, and efficient bargaining process that brings about just results. Id. at 
750. Furthermore, restricting a defendant’s ability to waive his right to an appeal—a “good” 
he can offer in exchange for a reduced sentence—may make it more difficult for a defen-
dant to receive an advantageous bargain. See id. at 749. 
104 See Howle, 166 F.3d at 1169. 
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tract law principles justify this free trading of rights.105 In 1995, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded in United States v. 
Wenger that rights holders are benefited when they can choose between 
exercising the right and exchanging it for something more valuable.106 
The court explained that allowing defendants to benefit from the exist-
ing agreement without being bound by the appellate waiver would ren-
der their promises meaningless and be destructive to the entire plea 
process.107 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has cautioned, 
however, that a plea bargain “contract” involves constitutional rights.108 
Thus, the relationship between plea agreements and contract law is not 
completely analogous because pleas implicate significant fairness con-
cerns absent in commercial contracts.109 Furthermore, the Second Cir-
cuit has explained that contract law requires courts to construe the plea 
against the government as the agreement’s drafter and holder of ad-
vantageous bargaining power.110 
 New York state courts also have adopted the contract law approach 
to appeal waivers.111 The New York Appellate Division has concluded 
that when the defendant receives the benefit of sentencing concessions 
in exchange for the appeal waiver, courts must uphold waivers to assure 
the State receives its benefit from the bargain.112 The New York Court 
of Appeals in Seaberg implicitly addressed the fairness concerns present 
in contract law when it stated that bargains made fairly should signal an 
                                                                                                                      
105 See id. The Eleventh Circuit held that after the defendant had signed his appeal 
waiver, the district court’s erroneous statement that the defendant could appeal had no 
effect on the bargain. See id. Just as any attempt to modify a contract after its acceptance is 
invalid, the district court could not attempt to change the terms of the plea after its accep-
tance. See id. 
106 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995). 
107 See id. (stating that the defendant “cannot have his cake and eat it too,” the court 
held the defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal valid and dismissed his appeal). 
108 United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). 
109 See id. But see Howle, 166 F.3d at 1168 (stating that “a plea agreement is, in essence, a 
contract between the Government and a criminal defendant”). 
110 See Ready, 82 F.3d at 559. Although the Second Circuit has held that appeal waivers 
are theoretically valid, it did not uphold the waiver at issue because the district court did 
not explain to the defendant that his appeal waiver included the waiver of the right to 
appeal an illegally imposed sentence. See id. at 560. Because the defendant waives the 
“valuable” right to correct a district court’s unknown and unannounced sentence in an 
appeal waiver, this court explained that a “knowing” waiver requires the district court to 
ensure that the defendant understands the full consequences of this act. See id. at 558. 
111 See, e.g., Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1025; People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140, 145 (App. 
Div. 1992) (giving effect to defendant’s waiver and dismissing his appeal). 
112 See Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 142. 
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end to the litigation, not the beginning.113 It reasoned that trial courts 
protect defendants by guaranteeing that plea bargains are reasonable 
and fair.114 The court noted that defendants are not required to seek 
plea bargains, and consequently, there is nothing inherently coercive 
about giving defendants the option to accept or reject a bargain.115 
III. A Minority of Courts Hold Appeal Waivers Per Se Invalid 
 Courts that hold appeal waivers per se invalid do so because the 
waivers violate due process, conflict with the public interest, and cannot 
comport with contract law requirements.116 One district court and a 
minority of state courts have held that plea bargains can never be con-
ditioned on appellate waivers because these waivers cannot satisfy the 
due process “knowing and voluntary” test.117 Additionally, these courts 
reason that appellate waivers undermine the public policies of uniform 
application of the law and error correction served through appellate 
review.118 Lastly, certain courts determine that appellate waivers violate 
contract law because the parties do not hold equal bargaining power.119 
A. A “Chilling Effect” on Appellate Rights That Violates Due Process 
 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has held that 
plea agreement provisions waiving appeal rights are facially invalid be-
cause these waivers can never be knowing and voluntary.120 In its 1997 
decision in United States v. Raynor, the court explained that a waiver of 
future rights is by definition “uninformed and unintelligent.”121 The 
court cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement that a valid waiver un-
der Rule 11 must constitute “an intentional relinquishment or aban-
                                                                                                                      
113 See 541 N.E.2d at 1024. 
114 See id. at 1025. 
115 See id. 
116 See, e.g., United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 49 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding such 
waivers coercive and unfair); People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) 
(explaining that these waivers violate public policy by insulating convictions from appellate 
review). 
117 See Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 44; infra notes 120–134 and accompanying text. 
118 See, e.g., United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 570–73 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., 
concurring); Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 45–48; Butler, 204 N.W.2d at 331; see also infra notes 
135–152 and accompanying text. 
119 See United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437, 439 (D.D.C. 1997); infra notes 153–
161 and accompanying text. 
120 See Johnson, 992 F. Supp. at 439. 
121 989 F. Supp. at 44 (refusing to accept the government’s plea conditioned on the 
defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal a sentence that had yet to be imposed). 
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donment of a known right or privilege.”122 The court in Raynor con-
cluded that a defendant cannot know what right he is waiving until a 
sentence is imposed.123 
 Furthermore, the district court explained that the waiver of appel-
late rights is not analogous to the typical waiver of constitutional rights 
in guilty pleas.124 Unlike appellate waivers, most constitutional waivers 
in guilty pleas involve the relinquishment of a presently known, clearly 
defined right.125 Concurring in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit’s 1992 decision in United States v. Melancon, Judge Robert M. 
Parker added that the act of waiving a right typically occurs at the mo-
ment the waiver is executed; one waives the right to be free from self-
incrimination and then admits guilt.126 In contrast, waiving the right to 
appeal a future sentencing error frees the defendant from none of the 
uncertainties surrounding the sentencing process.127 
 One state court has held appellate waivers unenforceable because 
their particular characteristics can never satisfy due process require-
ments.128 The Court of Appeals of Michigan in People v. Butler stated in 
1972 that, although statutory, the right to appeal plays an essential role 
in the criminal justice system.129 The court concluded that the govern-
ment has no right to put a price on the right to appeal; it must be “free 
and unfettered.”130 Appellate waivers, however, undermine this right by 
deterring defendants from raising valid issues before the State’s appel-
late courts.131 The court explained that the trading of appellate rights 
allows prosecutors to insulate from review guilty pleas accepted in viola-
tion of due process standards.132 To cure this “chilling effect” and pro-
tect a defendant’s right to appeal, the court in Butler decided that any 
                                                                                                                      
122 Id. (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). 
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 972 F.2d at 571 (Parker, J., concurring). 
127 See id. at 572. 
128 See Butler, 204 N.W.2d at 330. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 329 (quoting Worcester v. Comm’r, 370 F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1966)). As 
one commentator explained, if a defendant gets less time in exchange for waiving the 
right to appeal, then the defendant who refuses to waive the right in the plea must receive 
more time, and that greater amount constitutes the price of the appeal. Calhoun, supra 
note 21, at 147. Furthermore, this price may not be “rational” because a prosecutor would 
likely offer greater concessions in exchange for the appellate waiver when the defendant 
would have a valid issue to appeal. Id. Thus, the waiver would remove cases with legitimate 
issues from the appellate docket rather than those cases that are frivolous. Id. at 148. 
131 See Butler, 204 N.W.2d. at 331. 
132 See id. at 330. 
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plea conviction must be vacated when it required a defendant to waive 
appeal rights.133 Consequently, certain courts find that appellate waivers 
violate due process by requiring the forfeiture of unknown future 
claims and by placing an impermissible burden on the assertion of a 
right.134 
B. Appeal Waivers as Offensive to the Public Interest in Appellate Review 
 Courts that hold appellate waivers invalid explain that the public 
interest in appellate review requires that these waivers be unenforce-
able.135 Judge Parker contended in a concurrence in Melancon that even 
if the right to appeal is a “mere” statutory right, it does not necessarily 
follow that this right may be waived simply because it is “lesser” than 
waivable constitutional rights.136 Parker claimed that appellate waivers 
contravene broader institutional concerns for legislative intent and ju-
dicial integrity.137 Federal courts have concluded that appellate waivers 
insulate sentences from review and undermine the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s goal of limiting trial court discretion and sentencing dis-
parities.138 State and federal courts have explained appellate review as 
essential to upholding judicial integrity.139 
 The federal Sentencing Commission was established to promul-
gate federal Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) for courts to use 
in determining criminal sentences.140 Although the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit permits appellate waivers in limited cir-
cumstances, it has noted that a defendant’s right to appeal a sentence 
“serves an important public interest in avoiding the sentencing dispari-
ties that were seen to be a great problem with the pre-guidelines sys-
                                                                                                                      
133 Id. at 331. 
134 See, e.g., Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 44; Butler, 204 N.W.2d at 331. 
135 See Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 44–46. 
136 See Melancon, 972 F.2d at 573 (Parker, J., concurring). 
137 See id. 
138 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 
1996); Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 45. Section 991(b)(1)(B) states that a purpose of the Sentenc-
ing Commission is to “provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, 
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). 
139 See, e.g., Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 46; cf. State v. Gibson, 348 A.2d 769, 785 (N.J. 1975) 
(Pashman, J., dissenting) (stating that appellate review is essential to the integrity of the 
judicial system). 
140 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006). The Guidelines include determinations on whether 
to impose a sentence of probation, a term of imprisonment, or a fine, and a determination 
on the appropriate length of the probation or imprisonment or the appropriate amount of 
the fine. See id. § 994(a)(1). 
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tem.”141 The court added that “allowing a defendant to waive appeal of 
any and every sentence imposed ‘in violation of law’ would ‘invite[] 
disrespect for the integrity of the court[s].’”142 The Second Circuit has 
concluded that appellate review is necessary to enforce the Guidelines 
and ensure greater sentence uniformity.143 Furthermore, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia has explained that these waivers 
permit only the government to appeal erroneous applications of the 
Guidelines.144 It has cautioned that widespread use of these waivers 
guarantees that the only appeals of sentencing error are those brought 
by the government to correct mistakes in favor of defendants.145 
 In the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s 1975 decision in State v. Gib-
son, Justice Morris Pashman asserted in dissent that appellate waivers 
must be unenforceable because appeals courts protect the judicial sys-
tem from prosecutorial and trial court impropriety.146 Pashman alleged 
that there is a clear potential for abuse in plea negotiations.147 Conse-
quently, such waivers must be invalid so that appellate courts can vindi-
cate the rights of criminal defendants and maintain the integrity of the 
judicial system.148 Citing similar arguments, the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona held in 1979 in State v. Ethington that defendants could raise an 
appeal following a guilty plea regardless of an express appellate 
waiver.149 The court explained that the right to appeal cannot be nego-
tiated away in plea bargains because such waivers contradict public pol-
icy by insulating attorneys from review.150 The U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia in Raynor refused to enforce the government’s 
proposed waiver because the waiver prohibited the defendant from 
raising even egregious claims of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal.151 
Courts holding appellate waivers invalid have explained that it is unac-
                                                                                                                      
141 Ready, 82 F.3d at 556. 
142 Id. (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (1988)). 
143 See id. 
144 See Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 46. 
145 See id. 
146 See 348 A.2d at 784, 786 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Scholars have stated that appel-
late review is essential because decisions by three people having more time to think can 
correct decisions made by one person under time pressure. See Judith Resnik, Precluding 
Appeals, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 603, 620 (1985). 
147 See Gibson, 348 A.2d at 784–85 (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
148 See id. at 785. 
149 592 P.2d 768, 769–70 (Ariz. 1979) (permitting defendants to bring a timely appeal 
from a conviction notwithstanding an agreement not to appeal). 
150 Id. 
151 989 F. Supp. at 46 (noting that the proposed waiver required the defendant to sac-
rifice appellate rights in cases where his lawyer was ineffective, under the influence of 
drugs, or not working on behalf of his client’s best interest). 
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ceptable to value “gains” in speed and finality over appellate supervi-
sion of trial courts.152 
C. Unequal Bargaining Power Producing Unconscionable Contracts 
 Even if guilty pleas are contractual agreements, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia has explained that an appellate 
waiver condition renders these contracts unenforceable.153 The court 
observed in Raynor that prohibiting only the defendant from appealing 
the sentence was “inherently unfair; it is a one-sided contract of adhe-
sion; it will undermine the error correcting function of the courts of 
appeals in sentencing . . . .”154 In its 1997 decision in United States v. 
Johnson, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia explained 
that it would not accept the appellate waiver offered to the defendant 
because of the inequity in proscribing his appellate rights without 
analogously limiting the government’s appellate rights.155 The court 
found that the government already possessed superior bargaining 
power in plea negotiations with defendants.156 Prosecutors determine 
the precise charges brought, and the charges determine the ultimate 
sentence imposed under the Guidelines.157 The court observed that to 
provide the State with the additional power to require the waiver of ap-
pellate rights would only increase this advantage.158 
 Similarly, Justice Pashman asserted in his Gibson dissent that plea 
negotiations occur between parties with unequal bargaining power and 
alleged that such negotiations are prone to producing unconscionable 
outcomes.159 Pashman stated that appellate review of a sentence im-
                                                                                                                      
152 See Melancon, 972 F.2d at 573 (Parker, J., concurring). 
153 See, e.g., Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 49 (explaining that these waivers produce contracts 
of adhesion); see also United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating 
that plea bargains are essentially contracts between the government and the defendant). 
Legal commentators have suggested that the differences in bargaining power between the 
government and the defendant in the plea bargaining process result in circumstances 
similar to “a contract made under duress.” Blank, supra note 45, at 2072. Furthermore, 
scholars argue that “it is not at all clear that the ability to waive appeal rights does, in fact, 
operate as a bargaining chip. In more and more jurisdictions, waiver of appeal rights is a 
precondition to plea bargaining.” Calhoun, supra note 21, at 193. 
154 989 F. Supp. at 49. The plea expressly stated that the defendant could not invoke 
his statutory right to appeal the sentence after a guilty plea, but that the agreement did 
not limit the government’s statutory right to appeal a sentence. Id. at 43. 
155 See 992 F. Supp. at 439. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. at 439–40. 
158 Id. at 440. 
159 See 348 A.2d at 784–85 (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
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posed pursuant to a plea bargain comports with the contractual nature 
of the agreement because this review is necessary to prevent exploita-
tion.160 For these reasons, some decisions hold that contract law does 
not permit the government to utilize plea agreements to insulate con-
victions from appellate review.161 
IV. Specific Waiver of the Right to Appeal Suppression Motions 
A. Statutory Exceptions That Permit Appeals of Suppression Motions  
Following Guilty Pleas 
 Several states have carved out a statutory exception to the general 
rule in federal and state courts that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea 
bars subsequent constitutional challenges to the pretrial proceed-
ings.162 Defendants in these states can appeal pretrial motions to sup-
press evidence despite the fact that their convictions were based on 
guilty pleas.163 This right is significant because pretrial decisions to ad-
mit or exclude evidence are often determinative of trial outcomes.164 
                                                                                                                      
160 See id. at 786. 
161 See Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 49; Johnson, 992 F. Supp. at 439–40. 
162 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(m) (West 2007); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 
§ 710.70(2) (McKinney 1970); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-979(b) (West 1979); Wis. Stat. 
Ann. § 971.31(10) (West 2009); see also Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 289 (1975) 
(explaining that in New York, a guilty plea is not treated as a “break in the chain of events” 
in regards to certain constitutional claims raised in pretrial proceedings). Section (m) of 
the California statute states: 
[a] defendant may seek further review of the validity of a search or seizure on 
appeal from a conviction in a criminal case notwithstanding the fact that the 
judgment of conviction is predicated upon a plea of guilty . . . provided that 
at some stage of the proceedings prior to conviction he or she has moved for 
the return of property or the suppression of the evidence. 
Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(m). Section (2) of the New York statute states, “[a]n order finally 
denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from an ensuing 
judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment is entered upon a plea 
of guilty.” N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70(2). Section (b) of the North Carolina statute states, 
“[a]n order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal 
from a judgment of conviction, including a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty.” N.C. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-979(b). Section (10) of the Wisconsin statute states, “[a]n order deny-
ing a motion to suppress evidence or a motion challenging the admissibility of a statement of 
a defendant may be reviewed upon appeal from a final judgment or order notwithstanding 
the fact that the judgment or order was entered upon a plea of guilty . . . .” Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 971.31(10). 
163 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(m); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70(2); N.C. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-979(b); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.31(10). 
164 See People v. Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d 526, 531 (App. Div. 1988). Here the court ex-
plained that the entire prosecution on the charge of criminal possession of a controlled 
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Although federal law does not permit such appeals, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has approved of states granting this appellate right.165 
 In 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lefkowitz v. Newsome evaluated 
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 710.70(2).166 The Court 
noted that in states without such statutes, defendants who have suffered 
adverse pretrial rulings often proceed to trial solely to preserve their 
right to appeal claims of illegal seizures or involuntary confessions.167 In 
New York state courts, however, a defendant experiences no practical 
difference in appellate review following a guilty plea or a trial because 
neither conviction forecloses review of his constitutional claims.168 The 
Supreme Court stated that defendants who have lost suppression mo-
tions on which their defenses rest can preserve their right to appeal by 
pleading guilty instead of undergoing a full trial with a foregone conclu-
sion.169 This statutory right serves the public interest by permitting de-
fendants to appeal pretrial constitutional claims without the cost of inef-
ficient, resource-wasting trials.170 The Court noted that section 710.70(2) 
represented a “commendable effort[]” to relieve the overcrowded court 
system without infringing on constitutional rights.171 Similarly, the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin explained in its 1973 decision in State v. Meier 
that the legislative history of Wisconsin Criminal Procedure Law section 
971.31(10) made it apparent that this statute was adopted to “reduce the 
                                                                                                                      
substance rested on the constitutionality of the seizure of the cocaine. See id. If the court 
determined that the police violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, the evidence of the cocaine would be excluded 
at trial and consequently, the indictment would be dismissed. See id. at 531, 535. 
165 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970). The Court explained that the 
plea waives the right to contest the admissibility of any evidence the State might have of-
fered against the defendant, “unless the applicable law otherwise provides.” Id. 
166 420 U.S. at 289–90. The Court rejected the government’s argument that the New 
York defendant could not raise constitutional claims in his habeas corpus proceeding be-
cause his guilty plea sacrificed his right to raise prior, independent claims of constitutional 
violations. See id. at 293. Precluding the defendant from pursuing his constitutional claims 
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding would undermine legislative intent by discouraging 
such defendants from pleading guilty only to preserve their later right to assert constitu-
tional claims. See id. at 292. 
167 See id. at 289. 
168 See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70(2); Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 289. 
169 See Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 289. 
170 See id. at 292–93. 
171 Id. at 293. Legal scholars have interpreted these statutes to be premised on the pol-
icy of protecting public finances by avoiding the expense of “pro forma” trials, which 
would otherwise be required in order to preserve search and seizure issues for appeal. See 
Calhoun, supra note 21, at 175. 
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number of fully contested trials when the only issue is whether or not the 
order denying a motion for suppression of evidence was proper.”172 
 California and New York courts have held that a defendant may 
knowingly and voluntarily waive the statutory right to appeal suppres-
sion motions as a condition of a guilty plea.173 California courts enforce 
such waivers if they satisfy the knowing and voluntary test applied to 
general appeal waivers.174 New York appellate courts, in contrast, are 
split over whether satisfying the knowing and voluntary test is sufficient 
for a valid section 710.70(2) waiver.175 
B. California Courts Upholding Knowing and Voluntary Waivers of the 
Statutory Right to Appeal Suppression Motions 
 A California appeals court first considered whether the “nonfun-
damental” right conferred by section 1538.5(m) could be waived in a 
plea bargain in 1985 in People v. Charles.176 It held that a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the section 1538.5(m) right validly prohibits post-
plea appeals of suppression motions.177 The court concluded that a de-
fendant’s ability to waive significant constitutional rights to gain the 
benefits of a plea agreement naturally permits a defendant to waive the 
statutory right to appeal an adverse suppression motion.178 Because a 
defendant tacitly waives a search and seizure issue by failing to make an 
appropriate objection at trial, the court noted that no legal justification 
existed for prohibiting the defendant from expressly making a knowing 
and voluntary waiver.179 Moreover, it explained that a defendant’s vol-
untary and knowing waiver of the right to appeal suppression motions 
in exchange for something he values more highly brings mutual advan-
tages to the defendant and the State.180 
                                                                                                                      
172 210 N.W.2d 685, 689–90 (Wis. 1973) (concluding that a defendant was not required 
to move to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to preserve his right to review the 
denial of a motion to suppress evidence). 
173 See, e.g., People v. Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. 402, 406 (Ct. App. 1985); People v. Wil-
liams, 331 N.E.2d 684, 684 (N.Y. 1975) (per curiam). 
174 See Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 406. 
175 Compare Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531–32 (requiring implicitly that the waiver further 
a legitimate State interest in addition to being knowing and voluntary), with People v. Gray, 
432 N.Y.S.2d 153, 153 (App. Div. 1980) (dismissing a defendant’s appeal because his waiver 
was knowing and voluntary). 
176 See 217 Cal. Rptr. at 405. 
177 Id. at 406 (explaining that the defendant could knowingly and voluntarily waive his 
right to appeal an adverse suppression motion in exchange for a more lenient punishment). 
178 See id. 
179 See id. at 407. 
180 See id. at 405, 407. 
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 Subsequent California decisions consistently have followed Charles 
and upheld section 1538.5(m) waivers.181 In 1995 the California Court 
of Appeal held in People v. Berkowitz that a valid section 1538.5(m) 
waiver did not require the trial court to specifically inform the defen-
dant that the appeal waiver concerned suppression issues.182 The court 
explained that the scope of the waiver must be analyzed in terms of the 
reasonable expectations of the parties, and the waiver at issue clearly 
included all of the defendant’s appellate rights.183 It also stated that a 
knowing and voluntary waiver is enforced according to its terms regard-
less of whether the waiver is written or spoken.184 The court concluded 
that a defendant should be permitted to determine whether such a 
waiver would be favorable under the circumstances, and that such bar-
gains promote judicial economy.185 
C. New York Courts Applying Different Standards of Review to  
Suppression Motion Waivers 
 New York appellate courts have held the section 710.70(2) appeal 
right waivable, but do not have a uniform standard to determine when 
such waivers are valid.186 In 1975, the New York Court of Appeals held in 
People v. Williams that the defendant validly waived his section 710.70(2) 
right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion “in the circum-
stances of this case.”187 There, the court observed that if the defendant 
successfully appealed his motion to suppress statements following the 
guilty plea, the prosecution would have been unfairly prejudiced at the 
                                                                                                                      
181 See, e.g., People v. Berkowitz, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 152 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. 
Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 492–93 (Ct. App. 1993). 
182 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152 (discussing defendant who claimed he believed the appeal 
waiver related only to the merit of his charged offenses). 
183 See id. at 153 (explaining that the defendant had a right of appeal that he was giving 
up in the plea); see also Nguyen, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493. 
184 See Berkowitz, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153. 
185 See id. 
186 Compare Williams, 331 N.E.2d. at 684–85 (holding a knowing and voluntary waiver 
of the right to appeal an adverse ruling on suppression motions enforceable “under the 
circumstances”), with Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531 (requiring, in addition, that the waiver 
further a legitimate government interest). 
187 331 N.E.2d. at 684–85. The defendant indicated his desire to plead after losing his 
motion to suppress statements. Id. at 685. The prosecutor stated he would only accept the 
plea if the defendant agreed to an appellate waiver because the State had witnesses who 
were ready to testify at trial and had incurred significant expense in preparing a videotape 
showing the defendant’s admissions to the police. Id. Because the statements were not the 
sole basis for the People’s case, reversal of the suppression motion would have resulted in a 
new trial where the State’s witnesses may have been unavailable. Id. 
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subsequent trial.188 The court noted that the State had justification for 
imposing the appeal waiver condition.189 Additionally, the court ex-
plained that there was no doubt that the plea was knowing and volun-
tary because the defendant had thoroughly discussed it with counsel 
and been subjected to a methodical interrogation by the trial court re-
garding the plea and the specific waiver.190 Under these conditions, the 
court in Williams held the defendant to the waiver of his right to appeal 
the suppression motion.191 
 The Second, Third, and Fourth Departments of the New York 
Appellate Division have interpreted Williams as permitting section 
710.70(2) waivers when knowing and voluntary.192 Applying only the 
knowing and voluntary test, in 1980 the Second Department in People 
v. Gray dismissed a defendant’s appeal because the “defendant made a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal the denial of his 
motion to suppress evidence.”193 The Fourth Department engaged in 
a similar analysis in its 1984 decision in People v. Durant when it dis-
missed the defendant’s appeal because following the denial of his 
suppression motion, he had knowingly and voluntarily entered into a 
plea that waived his appellate rights.194 That same year, the Third De-
partment in People v. Di Orio reiterated the principle that a knowing 
and voluntary waiver of the statutory right to appeal a suppression 
motion is an acceptable condition of a plea bargain.195 The court 
noted that the prosecutor stated during the taking of the plea that the 
defendant’s appeal waiver concerned “all of the pretrial motions and 
earlier suppression hearings had in this particular case.”196 
 The First Department, however, has characterized this widespread 
enforcement as giving prosecutors carte blanche to condition pleas on 
section 710.70(2) appellate waivers.197 In 1988, the First Department 
upheld the defendant’s conviction in People v. Velazquez without reaching 
the validity of the appeal waiver.198 Justice Robert S. Smith wrote sepa-
                                                                                                                      
188 Id. 
189 See id. 
190 See id. 
191 Id. 
192 See, e.g., People v. Durant, 476 N.Y.S.2d 671, 671 (App. Div. 1984); People v. Di Orio, 
471 N.Y.S.2d 701, 702 (App. Div. 1984); People v. Gray, 432 N.Y.S.2d 153, 153 (App. Div. 
1980). 
193 432 N.Y.S.2d at 153. 
194 See 476 N.Y.S.2d at 671–72. 
195 See 471 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
196 Id. 
197 Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 528. 
198 See 527 N.Y.S.2d 972, 972 (App. Div. 1988). 
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rately to express concern for appellate jurisdiction and advocated for a 
fact-specific inquiry to determine each waiver’s validity.199 He claimed 
that effectuating the waiver would be inconsistent with the holding in 
Williams.200 He argued that the Williams court only permitted the appel-
late waiver “[i]n the circumstances of [that] case” because the prosecu-
tion would have been unfairly burdened had the suppression motion 
been reversed on appeal.201 Justice Smith contended that the parties to 
a plea cannot, even by agreement, usurp appellate court jurisdiction to 
review any determination on a motion to suppress evidence.202 
 In 1988, the First Department addressed a waiver of the sec-
tion 710.70(2) right in People v. Ventura and explained that unchecked 
appellate waivers offend the public interest in appellate review.203 The 
court stated that appellate courts have a “compelling duty” to assure 
themselves of the constitutionality of any waiver of rights.204 This re-
sponsibility is especially important in the realm of plea bargains where 
prosecutors wield so much power.205 It noted that the court in Williams 
only upheld a waiver of this right because under the specific facts of 
Williams, the waiver produced genuine, mutual benefits.206 Thus, the 
waiver served as a proper bargaining element in the plea.207 In contrast, 
many appellate waivers of adverse determinations on suppression mo-
tions insulate errors of constitutional significance from appellate review 
without advancing any legitimate State interest.208 
                                                                                                                      
199 See id. at 972–73 (Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
200 See id. at 973 (citing Williams, 331 N.E.2d. at 685) (agreeing that defendant know-
ingly and voluntarily pled guilty to second degree murder, but noting that the prosecution 
demanded the defendant waive his right to appeal the suppression motion in exchange for 
recommending a sentence of fifteen years to life rather than the maximum twenty-five 
years to life). 
201 See id. (citing Williams, 331 N.E.2d. at 685). 
202 See id. at 972–73. 
203 531 N.Y.S.2d at 528. The waiver at issue prohibited the defendant from appealing 
an adverse ruling on a suppression motion as a condition of his plea. Id. at 533. Because he 
had lost the motion on which his entire defense rested, the court stated that he realistically 
had no option but to accept the plea with the waiver condition. See id. 
204 Id. at 530. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. (noting that in Williams, the State was assured that it would not need to try a 
stale case after an appellate reversal and that the defendant avoided the uncertainties of 
trial and pled to a reduced offense). 
207 See id. 
208 See id. at 528, 531 (explaining that using waivers to spare the State the expense of 
appellate review is offensive to the State’s policy of providing the right of appellate review 
and bearing the cost of that review). 
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 In light of these grave consequences, the Ventura court concluded 
that “the public policy of this State requires that before the People can 
condition a plea to the defendant’s waiver of his right to appellate re-
view, it must advance some legitimate State interest . . . .”209 The court 
explained that appellate courts protect against trial court error or im-
propriety and must preserve the right to appeal by permitting only 
those knowing and voluntary waivers that serve a legitimate govern-
ment purpose.210 
V. Waivers of Suppression Motion Appellate Rights  
Must Be Unenforceable 
 Where state legislatures grant the statutory right to appeal adverse 
determinations on suppression motions following a guilty plea, this 
right must never be waivable.211 Even if certain appeal waivers are gen-
erally enforceable, suppression motion appellate waivers must be inva-
lid because the coercion involved in their execution violates due proc-
ess.212 Additionally, these particular waivers undermine public policy by 
nullifying express legislative intent.213 Statutes granting the right to ap-
peal an adverse suppression motion following a plea further public 
policies because they preserve defendants’ right to appeal without re-
source-wasting trials.214 Because the efficiency that these statutory rights 
guarantee is undercut by suppression motion appellate waivers, how-
ever, states that grant this right must prohibit its waiver.215 Lastly, con-
tract law proscribes these waivers because of the inequity between the 
parties when these waivers are executed.216 
 This Part advances many of the arguments utilized by the New York 
Appellate Division’s First Department in 1988 in People v. Ventura to in-
validate the suppression motion appeal waiver, but argues that the “le-
                                                                                                                      
209 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531. 
210 Id. 
211 See infra notes 212–292. 
212 See id. at 532; infra notes 219–231 and accompanying text. 
213 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 532; infra notes 232–253 and accompanying text. 
214 See Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(m) (West 2007) (permitting the defendant to appeal 
the suppression motion following the plea provided that the defendant moved for suppres-
sion before the plea was entered); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70(2) (McKinney 1970) 
(permitting an appeal of a suppression motion following a plea-based conviction); see also 
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 293 (1975). 
215 See Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 292. 
216 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d. at 531; infra notes 254–263 and accompanying text. 
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gitimate state interest” test cannot be effectively administered.217 To 
guarantee defendants’ rights and uphold legislative intent, there must be 
a blanket prohibition on all appellate waivers of suppression motions.218 
A. Suppression Motion Waivers Violate Due Process 
 Appellate waivers of adverse determinations on suppression mo-
tions violate due process because they are inherently coercive and pun-
ish defendants who assert their rights.219 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that the imposition of a penalty upon a defendant for exercising 
the right to appeal violates due process.220 For example, due process is 
contravened when a defendant is subjected to a harsher sentence fol-
lowing a successful appeal, retrial, and reconviction.221 The Court ex-
plained that vindictiveness against a defendant for exercising his rights 
must not affect his sentencing.222 Analogously, due process prohibits 
the prosecution from retaliating against a defendant who exercises his 
right to bring a suppression motion and loses by subsequently offering 
a plea with a harsher sentence and the requirement that he forgo his 
right to appeal this critical determination.223 The New York Court of 
Appeals upheld a sentencing appeal waiver in People v. Seaberg in 1989 
because the defendant had the choice to accept or reject the offer.224 In 
contrast, a defendant may be required to accept a suppression motion 
waiver because he has no practical alternative; he no longer possesses a 
trial defense following the adverse determination.225 
 The facts of Ventura evidence the coercive manner in which waivers 
of appellate rights to adverse suppression motions can be extracted.226 
Under the prosecutor’s plea offer in Ventura, the defendant risked 
doubling his sentence recommendation and waiving his right to appeal 
                                                                                                                      
217 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d. at 531–33 (explaining the coercive nature of plea bargain-
ing); see also People v. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819 (Ct. App. 1989) (encouraging appeal 
waivers in plea bargains). 
218 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d. at 532; infra notes 264–292 and accompanying text. 
219 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d. at 529, 533. 
220 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724–25 (1969); Gregory M. Dyer, Note, 
Criminal Defendant’s Waiver of the Right to Appeal—An Unacceptable Condition of a Negotiated 
Sentence or Plea Bargain, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 649, 656–57 (1990) (asserting that the 
Court has explained that the Due Process Clause requires that states not limit the oppor-
tunity to appeal in a criminal case). 
221 See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724–25. 
222 See id. 
223 See id.; Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 532–33. 
224 See 541 N.E.2d 1022, 1025, 1027 (N.Y. 1989). 
225 See id. at 1025; Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 533. 
226 See supra notes 1–21 and accompanying text. 
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his suppression claim if he lost his motion.227 The court characterized 
this plea negotiation as “punitive and coercive” because realistically, the 
defendant could not have rejected the prosecutor’s plea offer.228 The 
defendant’s only viable defense rested on suppressing evidence that was 
ruled admissible.229 Because the defendant had no legitimate alterna-
tive, conditioning the plea bargain on the waiver of the right to appeal 
the suppression motion rendered the plea involuntary and coercive.230 
The government ignored the concerns for fairness and justice present 
in the knowing and voluntary test in pursuing its single-minded goal of 
preventing the defendant from appealing his meritorious constitu-
tional claim.231 
B. Suppression Motion Appeal Waivers Are Contrary to Public Policy 
 Appeal waivers of adverse suppression motions must be invalid be-
cause they contravene public policy.232 These specific waivers under-
mine the express goals behind legislatures’ codification of the statutory 
right to appeal suppression motions.233 Additionally, these waivers re-
move issues of constitutional magnitude from appellate review.234 
 In codifying the right to appeal adverse determinations on sup-
pression motions following a guilty plea, state legislatures have sought 
to avoid the cost of unnecessary trials.235 Many defendants know that 
they cannot prevail at trial unless they succeed in suppressing evi-
dence.236 In states that apply the general rule that pleas foreclose fur-
ther review of constitutional challenges, defendants often proceed to 
trial for the sole purpose of preserving these claims.237 In contrast, un-
der California Penal Code section 1538.5(m) and New York Criminal 
Procedure Law section 710.70(2), a defendant who pleads guilty may 
still seek appellate review of the suppression motion without having to 
                                                                                                                      
227 See 531 N.Y.S.2d at 532–33. 
228 See id. at 533. 
229 See id. 
230 See id. 
231 See id. 
232 See id. 531–32. 
233 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 532. 
234 See id. at 528; supra notes 203–210 and accompanying text. 
235 See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70(2) (1970); Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 285, 289, 292–93 
(1975) (evaluating the procedure for a defendant to raise a suppression motion appeal 
following a plea under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70(2)). 
236 See Lefkowitz, 421 U.S. at 292. 
237 See id. 
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undergo a full trial to preserve this right.238 The guilty plea permits the 
constitutional issues to be litigated while sparing the expense and time 
of a trial.239 All parties expect that the plea will not foreclose judicial 
review of the alleged constitutional violation.240 
 Although the defendant in Ventura accepted the guilty plea with 
the waiver condition, other defendants who know that the plea fore-
closes appellate review of their suppression motions may be dissuaded 
from pleading guilty.241 Thus, if the prosecution requires these waivers, 
defendants will need to reject the plea to preserve this right through a 
trial, as though the right had not already been granted by statute.242 
This result undermines legislatures’ purpose of improving efficiency in 
the criminal system without infringing on defendants’ abilities to assert 
constitutional rights.243 Therefore, even courts that uphold appellate 
waivers generally by citing efficiency concerns must hold suppression 
motion appeal waivers invalid because they encourage defendants to 
undergo a full trial solely to maintain their appellate rights.244 
 Furthermore, suppression motion appellate waivers may insulate 
convictions based on constitutional violations from review without ad-
vancing any public interest.245 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
avenues of appellate review are so fundamental that, once established, 
they must be kept free of unreasonable conditions that impede open 
and fair access to the courts.246 The New York Court of Appeals has 
characterized the right to appeal as an “integral part of our judicial sys-
                                                                                                                      
238 See Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(m) (West 2007) (permitting the defendant to appeal 
the suppression motion following the plea provided that the defendant moved for sup-
pression before the plea was entered); N.Y. Crim. Proc Law. § 710.70(2) (permitting an 
appeal of a suppression motion following a plea-based conviction). 
239 Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 289–90 (characterizing this law as preventing the unnecessary 
waste of time and energy consumed in such trials). 
240 See id. 
241 See id.; Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 529. In Lefkowitz, the Supreme Court addressed the 
ability of a New York defendant to file a federal habeas corpus petition claiming an uncon-
stitutional seizure. 420 U.S. at 291. The Court predicted that if it did not grant these de-
fendants federal habeas corpus, they would not be inclined to plead guilty, but rather to 
proceed to trial solely to preserve their right to a federal forum in which to litigate their 
constitutional claims. Id. at 293. Such a result, the Court concluded, would undermine 
New York’s attempt to limit such wasteful trials. See id. 
242 See Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 292. 
243 See id. at 293. 
244 See id. at 292–93. 
245 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 530–31. 
246 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25 & n.4 (1974) (addressing defendant’s claim that 
being charged with a higher offense for the same acts following an appeal violated due 
process by penalizing him for exercising his statutory right to appeal). 
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tem . . . . [I]t has been the consistent policy of our courts to preserve 
and promote that right as an effective, if imperfect, safeguard against 
impropriety or error in the trial . . . .”247 The public policy of New York 
is to provide the right of appellate review to convicted defendants and 
to bear the cost of that appeal.248 The only rationale for imposing the 
waiver requirement in Ventura, however, was to assure that the appeals 
court did not hear the appeal, reverse the decision, and dismiss the in-
dictment.249 When prosecutors can impose these waivers in pleas, it is 
the prosecutor, rather than the appeals court, who determines that a 
conviction remains unquestioned without review of the constitutional 
violations that may have preceded it.250 
 Additionally, although courts enforcing general appeal waivers of-
ten cite their effectiveness in reducing “frivolous” appeals, the facts of 
Ventura evidence that appellate waivers of constitutional challenges may 
limit appellate review of meritorious claims.251 For example, when the 
prosecution’s entire case relies on evidence that the defendant seeks to 
suppress, the prosecution will be more inclined to offer the defendant 
a generous plea bargain to a reduced offense if he agrees not to raise 
his suppression claim.252 If the defendant proceeds with a motion to 
suppress and loses, the prosecutor may impose the appellate waiver 
condition on the subsequent plea to assure there is no appellate rever-
sal resulting in the dismissal of charges.253 
C. Suppression Motion Waivers Violate Contract Law Principles 
 Suppression motion appellate waivers violate contract law require-
ments because they may be executed after the defendant has lost his 
                                                                                                                      
247 People v. Pride, 147 N.E.2d 719, 720 (N.Y. 1958). 
248 Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 532. 
249 See id. at 532, 535. 
250 See id. at 532. Commentators assert that the complexity of the constitutional issues 
in suppression motions raises concerns over whether a single authority, not subject to ap-
pellate review, can generate consistent and accurate results over time. Calhoun, supra note 
21, at 176. Scholars argue that the more remote the court and diluted the evidence, the 
easier it becomes for a court reviewing a motion to focus on the procedural aspects of the 
case rather than the question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. See id. at 177. 
251 See Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819; Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531. 
252 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531. 
253 See id. at 531–32. In Ventura, the court explained that by doubling the defendant’s 
sentence recommendation and conditioning the plea on the appellate waiver, the prosecu-
tion acted primarily to punish the defendant for exercising his right to raise the suppres-
sion motion and prevent him from raising the suppression motion on appeal. Id. 
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pretrial motion and the State’s power is heightened.254 The appellate 
waiver is no longer a bargaining chip that can be freely traded but 
rather a condition imposed by a prosecutor who knows the defendant 
possesses a weak or non-existent trial defense.255 The defendant has no 
choice but to accept the plea with the appellate waiver condition.256 In 
1997, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in United States 
v. Johnson held a waiver of the right to appeal sentencing issues unen-
forceable because the government already possessed superior bargain-
ing power in plea negotiations and this waiver would only increase its 
advantage.257 Likewise, in situations where this inequity between the par-
ties is increased following the denial of the defendant’s suppression mo-
tion, the government’s power must not be further enhanced through 
suppression motion appellate waivers.258 
 Moreover, contract law requires that an agreement that surren-
ders the right to appeal be based upon consideration.259 State courts 
utilizing a contract law analysis have upheld general appeal waivers to 
assure that both the defendant and the government receive the bene-
fit of the bargain.260 Under this mutuality of advantage premise, the 
State cannot impose the condition of appellate waiver in a plea with-
out offering the defendant something additional in exchange.261 As 
shown in Ventura, however, the government may try to impose the 
suppression motion waiver without granting the defendant any addi-
tional benefit.262 Thus, these specific waivers cannot be enforced un-
der a contract law analysis.263 
                                                                                                                      
254 See United States v. Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437, 439–40 (D.D.C. 1997) (refusing to 
uphold an appellate waiver because of the government’s superior bargaining power); State 
v. Gibson, 348 A.2d 769, 784–85 (N.J. 1975) (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
255 See United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1169 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Ventura, 531 
N.Y.S.2d at 533. 
256 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 533. 
257 See 992 F. Supp. at 439–40. 
258 See id. 
259 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531. 
260 People v. Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (App. Div. 1992) (explaining that when the 
defendant receives sentencing concessions in exchange for his generalized waiver of the 
right to appeal, the waiver must be enforced so that the State receives its benefit from the 
bargain). 
261 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531. The court provides an example of valid considera-
tion by citing a civil case in which both parties to the litigation, each of whom disputed 
certain rulings, mutually agreed to waive appellate review. Id. (citing Townsend v. Master-
son, 15 N.Y. 587, 589–90 (1857)); see also Teeter, supra note 82, at 740 (explaining when 
waivers constitute valid consideration in a contract). 
262 See 531 N.Y.S.2d at 529. 
263 See id. at 531. 
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D. Suppression Motion Appellate Waivers Must Be Prohibited to Prevent 
Coercion and Uphold Legislative Intent 
 Waivers of the statutory right to appeal suppression motions must 
never be enforced because they frequently violate due process and con-
tract law requirements and undermine public policies.264 The First De-
partment in Ventura held such waivers valid only when knowing and 
voluntary and in furtherance of a legitimate State interest.265 This stan-
dard protects defendants’ rights and prosecutors who may, under cer-
tain circumstances, be unfairly prejudiced by a defendant’s appeal fol-
lowing a guilty plea.266 
 The court, however, did not define what constitutes a “legitimate 
state interest.”267 It only stated, without further examples, that prejudice 
to a prosecutor in a subsequent trial following appellate reversal justi-
fies the government’s imposition of an appellate waiver.268 Additionally, 
it is not clear whether the government could ever claim that it would be 
unfairly prejudiced in the absence of an appeal waiver when, as in Ven-
tura, appellate reversal would result in the dismissal of charges rather 
than a new trial.269 This ambiguity is problematic because courts that 
hold appellate waivers generally enforceable explain finality and effi-
ciency as legitimate state interests, whereas courts that hold them per se 
invalid emphasize the importance of sentence uniformity and judicial 
integrity assured through appellate review.270 Therefore, courts apply-
ing this test may determine the waiver’s enforceability based on their 
arguments for or against appeal waivers generally rather than on the 
particular waiver’s characteristics.271 
 Furthermore, the legitimate state interest test may not be objec-
tively applied because it is administered and reviewed by trial and ap-
pellate judges who, in both California and New York, have expressed 
support for appellate waivers generally.272 The California Court of Ap-
                                                                                                                      
264 See id. at 531–33. 
265 See id. at 531. 
266 See id. at 530–31. 
267 See id. 
268 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 530. 
269 See id. at 530, 535. 
270 See United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 46 (D.D.C. 1997); Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 
1024–25. 
271 See Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 46; Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1024–25. 
272 See, e.g., Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (encouraging appeal waivers as a “powerful 
tool” to limit frivolous appeals); Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 141 (stating that the judge normally 
requires such waivers in plea agreements); see also supra notes 98–102 and accompanying 
text. 
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peal in 1989 in People v. Olson explained that prosecutors and trial 
judges should consider obtaining appellate waivers when “appropriate” 
to reduce the number of frivolous appeals.273 The court implied that 
prosecutors and trial judges, parties interested in avoiding appellate 
reversal, should determine whether or not the defendant has a valid or 
frivolous appellate claim.274 
 The New York Appellate Division, Second Department, has stated 
that “[t]he Trial Justice should not participate in plea discussions.”275 
Despite this disapproval of judicial involvement in plea negotiations, 
however, the same court in People v. Burk in 1992 enforced an appellate 
waiver after the trial judge stated that he usually required their inclu-
sion in any plea agreement he accepted.276 Furthermore, the court in 
Burk explained that the State had a legitimate interest in finality and 
holding defendants to their bargains.277 Thus, even if this court had 
adopted the legitimate state interest test, the waiver would have met 
this court’s standard, even though the Ventura court indicated that fi-
nality alone was not a valid policy goal.278 The legitimate state interest 
test must not be adopted because it relies on the objective determina-
tions of trial judges with divergent conceptions of valid policy goals.279 
 Additionally, under the legitimate state interest test prosecutors 
are charged with stating the government’s legitimate interest.280 Even 
the First Department in Ventura recognized the conflict of interest be-
tween prosecutors seeking final convictions and the protection of 
criminal defendants’ rights.281 It stated, “[s]adly, it is sometimes neces-
sary to remind prosecutors of the delicate role they play in the criminal 
justice system: . . . ‘[i]t is not enough for him to be intent on the prose-
cution of his case.’”282 The court explained that prosecutors do not 
have the singular function of advancing the rights of their side, but 
                                                                                                                      
273 See 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819. 
274 See id. 
275 People v. Ramos, 292 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939–41 (App. Div. 1968) (criticizing the trial 
court’s attempt to insulate the defendant’s sentence from appellate review). 
276 See 586 N.Y.S.2d at 141. 
277 See id. at 142. 
278 See id. But see Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 532 (explaining there was no legitimate inter-
est in preserving a conviction for the sake of the conviction alone). 
279 See, e.g., Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (discussing the need to reduce appeals); Burk, 
586 N.Y.S.2d at 141–42 (stating that the State has a legitimate interest in finality). 
280 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531; see also People v. Stevenson, 231 N.W.2d 476, 477 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (explaining that a prosecutor cannot avoid review by bargaining 
away a defendant’s right to appeal). 
281 See 531 N.Y.S.2d at 532. 
282 Id. (quoting People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d 705, 707 (N.Y. 1980)). 
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must also remember that the defendant, as a member of the public, is 
entitled to fair treatment.283 The same court that set forth a test that 
relies on prosecutorial transparency felt obliged to instruct that the 
prosecutor’s mission is not so much to convict as to assure a just re-
sult.284 Consequently, under the legitimate state interest test, prosecu-
tors seeking to uphold convictions explain the waiver’s justification and 
courts determine its enforceability, often employing varying definitions 
of valid government goals.285 
 In certain situations, the prohibition on suppression motion ap-
peal waivers may prejudice the prosecution who has entered into a plea 
and must later try a stale case following appellate reversal.286 The due 
process, contract law, and public policy arguments against suppression 
motion waivers, however, justify this limited and forewarned risk.287 Ad-
ditionally, this argument concedes that because courts find that waivers 
of the right to appeal unknown future sentences satisfy the due process 
knowing and voluntary test, arguably waivers of the right to appeal a 
known determination on a suppression motion must also satisfy due 
process.288 Because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that even un-
known rights may be waived when this represents a rational decision, 
however, the timing of the appealed error, either before or after the 
plea is taken, is an insignificant difference and does not provide sup-
pression motion appellate waivers a greater indicia of validity.289 In both 
situations, due process requires only that the defendants know that they 
are giving up possible appeals.290 To the extent that suppression motion 
and sentencing error appeal waivers are distinguishable, suppression 
motion appellate waivers are more offensive to due process because of 
the coercive manner in which they can be extracted and implicate 
greater public policy concerns because they undermine efficiency by 
encouraging defendants to undergo full trials to preserve appellate 
rights.291 The importance of suppression motions in criminal adjudica-
                                                                                                                      
283 See id. 
284 See id. at 531–32. 
285 See State v. Ethington, 592 P.2d 768, 769 (Ariz. 1979). Compare Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. 
at 819 (identifying efficiency and conservation of scarce judicial resources as valid state 
interests), with Ventura, 51 N.Y.S.2d at 532 (describing access to appellate review as a public 
policy of the State). 
286 See People v. Williams, 331 N.E.2d 684, 685 (N.Y. 1975) (per curiam). 
287 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531–33. 
288 See Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 394 (1987). 
289 See id. 
290 See id. 
291 See Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 531–33. 
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tions, along with the need to balance defendants’ rights with the effi-
ciency concerns in the criminal system, require that courts ensure the 
viability of these statutory rights by holding suppression motion appel-
late waivers invalid.292 
Conclusion 
 The reversal of the suppression motion in People v. Ventura demon-
strates the danger of enforcing suppression motion appellate waivers: 
that it will insulate erroneous trial court determinations from appellate 
review. Some defendants may seek appellate waivers in exchange for 
more favorable conditions in the plea bargain. In the context of sup-
pression motions, however, there is a greater likelihood that these waiv-
ers are unilaterally imposed on a plea agreement that the defendant 
has little choice but to accept. Such waivers substantiate the arguments 
advanced by the minority of courts that hold all appellate waivers per se 
invalid because they violate due process, public policy, and contract law. 
Prosecutors may utilize these waivers to dissuade defendants from rais-
ing suppression motions and to punish defendants who proceed with 
their motions and lose. Additionally, the waiver of this right, in contrast 
to appellate waivers of other rights, expressly contravenes certain states’ 
legislative intent. Assuming that the majority of courts are correct in 
advancing efficiency as a policy goal, these waivers contravene this goal 
by encouraging defendants to proceed to trial solely to preserve their 
suppression motion appellate rights. Although prosecutors may some-
times have a valid reason for requiring such waivers, judicial partiality 
towards appeal waivers generally make clear that only a complete pro-
hibition on suppression motion appellate waivers can protect defen-
dants’ rights and advance public policy. 
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292 See, e.g., Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (explaining the need to conserve judicial re-
sources); Burk, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 142 (noting the importance of holding defendants to their 
bargains to ensure the State’s legitimate interest in finality). 
